MONGOLIAN PEOPLE`S REVOLUTION, 1921
Moscow leaders continued to demand the establishment of a Mongolian state and political institution urgently. This state and political institution had to encompass establishing a party, a provisional government-in-exile, and an army. Shumiatskiy, as was prescribed by Moscow, was to "advise" the Mongols to establish its government, occupy Maimaachin town, and appeal to Russia to liberate Mongolia from the white guards. On March 17, 1921, Shumiatsky sent a strictly confidential letter with a detailed report to Lenin.
MONGOLIAN PEOPLE`S REVOLUTION, 1921
THE HEARTH OF THE REVOLUTION AT THE BORDER
By the end of 1920, revolutionaries were concentrated in Kyakhta, a town bordering Mongolia and Russia. Transformed into a border post between Russia and China by the Treaty of 1727, this small town became the main commercial port between the two countries. In Russia, this agglomeration was called Troitskossavsk, after the name of the count who signed this treaty, and the Mongolian part of the post was later named Altanbulag by Mongols.
General Xu Shuzheng* had stationed several hundred Chinese soldiers in Kyakhta on the Mongolian side to guard the border, who were later joined by Chinese troops driven from Urga by Baron Ungern von Sternberg*, to number around 1,500 men.
The Soviet government dominated the Russian side of the border. This small town gathered future revolutionaries, instructors from the Mongol-Tibetan department, representatives of the Mongolian People's Party, and Buryats supporters of Pan-Mongolia, and altogether were writing the scenario of the Mongolian revolution.
Among the representatives of the MPP, the fruit of the union between the old mid and low-level government officers, almost no people knew law, economics, or diplomacy. Nevertheless, they were all patriots who wanted to expel the Chinese from Mongolia and restore the monarchy. Bodoo was the only one affected by the Bolshevic contagion. His thirst for education and his ideological quest often led him to meet with Russian consulate members. Unfortunately, his weakness was receiving everything he heard without a critical look and believing everything he heard or was told. He was the most influenced by the Bolsheviks Mongol. The influence of the Bolsheviks is evident in some of his later actions, such as the abolition of the monarchy, the creation of the republic, the ban on wearing traditional clothes, the prohibition on braiding one's hair, etc. Nonetheless, he later realized his mistake, and shortly before his death, he said that the Bolsheviks advocated a very problematic ideology and that they were dangerous.
Bodoo's* only confidante was Choibalsan*, who accompanied him everywhere, mostly because he had nothing much to do. His "big brothers" needed his knowledge of the Russian language. Yet, according to Pershin*, though Choibalsan had studied in Irkutsk for almost three years, he spoke Russian very poorly, understood even worse than he could talk, and barely put together a few words to make up a sentence. Moreover, his native Mongolian writing was terrible, which prevented him from being posted to senior government positions.
Danzan*, a member of the group of public officers, proved to be the smartest and most clever of these men. Although he lacked formal education, this patriot was the first to decipher the plans of the Bolsheviks. He remained loyal to the ideas of an independent state, the Bogda Khan*, and religion. His closest aide was Sukhbaatar*, a courageous, honest, and ardent man, well-versed in military affairs. He studied the military affairs of the Red commanders and consulted them regularly about how to apply this or that military knowledge or experience in Mongolia. But, he understood nothing about political or social affairs and was naive in the face of Bolshevik ideology. While he proved to be an excellent military scholar, on the other hand, he was not very adept in finance, administration, or diplomacy.
On the Mongolian side (if we can put it that way), two Buryats from Urga played crucial roles. One of them was Tseden-Ish. At home, he was called by his last name, Gachit or Gachitsky (Gochisky), the name of his home village. This intelligent and educated man, a patriot loyal to Pan-Mongolism, made a good impression on the Russian Communists who decided to use him in Mongolia. However, Tseden-Ish held very different opinions and enjoyed great popularity among Mongols and Buryats. He was helping the Buryats, who had escaped the new Russian "communist paradise" to settle in Mongolia. Nevertheless, he believed the Bolsheviks' promises to help those who visited Urga in 1920 and persuaded the Mongols to follow them.
The other Buryat was Professor Tseveen Jamtsarano*, who had studied at a high school in Irkutsk and the University of St. Petersburg. This passionate advocate of Pan-Mongolism hated everything associated with Russia. While teaching the Mongolian language in St. Petersburg, he took part in the revolutionary movements, and escaping, he settled in Khuree in 1914. In 1915 he participated in the trilateral talks as an interpreter, and since then, he has worked hard to educate the Mongols. The intellectual Jamtsarano was very different from the thousands of Buryat refugees who fled revolutions and conflicts in Russia and migrated to Mongolia at the turn of the 20th century. He never wanted to march in the front lines. Rather he would work in the back, supporting, helping, and directing from behind the scenes. All Mongolian leaders approached Jamtsarano for help and advice, especially on Russian issues.
If Jamtsarano had not been in Kyakhta, Mongolia's fate could have turned somewhat different. Russian diplomats led by G. V. Chicherin did not want to send their troops or organize a revolution in Mongolia not to maltreat China. Therefore, Moscow was trying to contain the aspirations of the Buryats of Ude and Irkutsk and the desires of the Mongol-Tibetan department. But, by this time, the Bolsheviks assembled in Kyakhta had succeeded in securing the Mongolian request to create a government in exile and aid from Soviet Russia. They had already drawn up plans for the entry of the Red Army into Mongolia to overthrow the Bogda Khan, as they had done with Nicholas II, and promote the reform of Soviet Mongolia. It is said that Jamtsarano played a fundamental role in containing these events and intentions. Another man also understood that radical changes in profoundly religious and underdeveloped Mongolia would entail dangers. After all, some people knew Mongolia's traditions and conservatism among the people of Eastern Siberia.
THE COMMUNIST DECLARATION OF THE MPP
On March 1, 1921, at the initiative of the Mongol-Tibetan department, a meeting was organized in Troytskossavsk (now Kyakhta, a Russian border port). Records show that representatives of the Mongolian People's Party, Danzan and Sukhbaatar, and some Mongolian traders who worked in the region participated in this meeting. At that time, Bodoo, Chagdarjav*, Dogsom*, Choibalsan, and Losol* were in Mongolia. Also in attendance were the Far Eastern representatives of the Comintern, Tseveen Jamtsarano and S. Borisov, and the Plenipotentiary Representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, O. Makstenik*, who played the leading role in the meeting. Later, in 1925, it was decided that this meeting should officially be considered the first Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which instituted the Party.
Makstenik was Moscow's first Soviet Consul in Mongolia, but he was not allowed to cross the border as Kolchak's Consul was already in Urga. He had an office at the edge, where the MPP's first meeting was held, where the Mongolian asylum government was formed, where the Mongolian Revolutionary Army was organized, and finally, where a decision to send the Red Army to Mongolia was made. Makstenik, appointed from Moscow, knowing more about foreign relations, was superior to the Siberian revolutionaries.
The purpose of this meeting was to justify the introduction of Soviet troops to Mongolia that it was within international law. Delegates were to resolve complex and mutually exclusive issues, such as defeating Ungern in Mongolia, not offending the Kuomintang allies, obtaining approval from official Beijing authorities, and initiating a revolution in Mongolia.
As a result of this Party Congress, a manifesto was issued stating that the MPP was a pro-communist Party fighting against global capitalism. This decision did not come from the 4-5 Mongols participating in this Congress. The Congress also defined a goal that in the future, a federal republic would be formed, which would include Southern China, Northern China, Sichuan, Tibet, Khoton, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Outer Mongolia. It is hard to believe that there would be Mongols who would want to unite in a federal republic with China from which they so ardently wanted to separate using all possible ways and means. This decision undoubtedly was the invention of the Mongolian-Tibetan department, initiated by Moscow, and it also shows that those 4-5 Mongols played no role in that meeting. It was Moscow's order.
The Congress, attended by 26 delegates, elected the Central Committee and approved the Party program. Danzan became the Chairman of the Committee, and Rinchino became his deputy. Tseden-Ish Dashepilov (Gochitsky), Balamsu Tserenei* (Ayur Vanchikov), Sandagdorji Jambalon, S. Natsov, Georgy Danchinov, N. Batukhanov, and some other Buryats were elected members of the Central Committee. Another Buryat, Jamsranov, a party leadership member, drew up a program document—the plenipotentiary representative of the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, B.Z. Shumyatsky supervised the work of Congress.
At the Congress, the Mongolian Provisional Government was elected. Chagdarjav became Prime Minister, and Rinchino - was his first deputy. After the revolution's victory, in September 1921, Rinchino* became Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. That was the top-level position to rule the country.
In the fall of 1939, Hitler and Stalin signed a secret treaty dividing Europe. That went down in history as the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union acquired half of Poland, Bessarabia of Romania, the Carpathians, and the Baltic countries. Before occupying these territories, the Soviet Union arbitrarily annexed Finnish Karelia. Therefore, the USSR issued an ultimatum to Finland demanding the Karelian Isthmus because it was too close to St. Petersburg. Finland refused, so a war was declared. Shortly before these events, the government in exile of the Democratic Republic of Finland was erected in Moscow, and the Finnish Otto Kuusinen*, a representative of the Comintern who had resided there for a long time, was appointed Head of that government. This government, in exile, formally asked the Soviet Union to send troops to Finland. The Finnish conflict expelled the USSR from the League of Nations. However, the request of the government in exile authorized the USSR to unabashedly assert that this war was not an act of aggression but only a military assistance to the Finnish people.
This method of aggression of the Soviets on neighboring countries was not first applied here. They had already tried to create a comparable government-in-exile on their territory in March 1921.
The Chinese representative in Urga Chen Yi*, after his defeat by Baron Ungern, fled to Troytskossavsk, where he requested the Red Army to enter Mongolia. That, in essence, meant that Beijing did endorse this operation. On the other hand, the Mongolian government had to give such permission. But clearly, neither the government of Manzushri Khutagt Tserendorj*, formed in February 1921 nor the Bogda Khan would give such permission to the Bolsheviks.
Moscow leaders continued to demand the establishment of a Mongolian state and political institution urgently. This state and political institution had to encompass establishing a party, a provisional government-in-exile, and an army. Shumiatskiy, as was prescribed by Moscow, was to "advise" the Mongols to establish its government, occupy Maimaachin town, and appeal to Russia to liberate Mongolia from the white guards. On March 17, 1921, Shumiatsky* sent a strictly confidential letter with a detailed report to Lenin.
Chen's creation of a government in exile had been discussed long before 1921 when Baron Ungern established his power in Mongolia. This government in exile would have brought together famous personalities like Khatanbaatar Magsarjav, Minister of Foreign Affairs Tserendorj, Minister of Justice, Prince Namsrai, Gung Bayar, Beis Sumiya, and the son of Khanddorj. But, sadly, that plan had to be dropped, as all of these "government candidates" supported and cooperated with Ungern, whom they saw as a liberator.
On October 29, 1920, at a meeting of the Oriental People's Section of the Russian Bolshevik Communist Party, the Head of the Chinese Section, Mr. M. Abramson* said: "... before discussing the possibility of forming a government, I would like to hear information on Mongolian leaders to be involved in the process ...". So the list of the most prominent people of Mongolia included Tserendorj.
Assuming that the Oriental People's Section was formed on October 6, 1920, in just a few days, preparations for establishing a puppet government in Mongolia already began.
Thus the Russians began materializing their decision to form a new Mongolian government concurrently. On March 13, 1921, the Provisional Government of Mongolia was formed with the monk Chagdarjav at its Head, who had accompanied Danzan to Moscow and returned to Troytskossavsk. The People's Party's Bodoo became a government official after his return to Khuree. Therefore, the second person in rank after Bodoo in the Party, Chagdarjav, was duly named to this. The Moscow Comintern had allocated three million rubles to organize the revolution in Mongolia and to create this provisional puppet government. This so-called government included a Ministry of the Interior, a Ministry of the Army, a Ministry of Finance, and a Ministry of Western Military Affairs and Guards. Established outside the country's borders, this government had 5-6 Mongols and the same number of ministries! Three of the five ministries were warfare ministries. Yet, the official legal government existed in Urga and was operating under the leadership of Tserendorj!
Chagdarjav thus became the Head of the provisional government in exile, which members were Sukhbaatar, Bodoo, Bilegtsaikhan, Sumiya, and Choibalsan. One of the ministerial positions was left vacant to be later filled by someone from Uriankhai. One of the key Provisional Government's key members, Bodoo, also held a post in the official Khuree government of Mongolia!
The main goal of the Provisional People's Government was to "… liberate the country from Chinese tyranny…" But this goal had already been achieved. Indeed, there were no more Chinese invaders in the territory of Mongolia, since Baron Ungern and the Mongols had driven them out! And the last Chinese batch was deported to China by Bolsheviks through Russian territory.
In this challenging situation, the Communists succeeded in obtaining from Sukhbaatar and Bilegsaikhan an oath-like guarantee which clearly stated what to do next, who to consider enemies and who to consider friends, and who to obey and listen:
March 5, 1921
This note is made to guarantee that:
We, the Central Committee of our Party and the General Military Commandment of the Party, should disassociate the Mongols, Baron Ungern, and other white Russian soldiers. We will spread the ideology of the People's Party among the Mongolian people and strengthen their friendship with Soviet Russia. We, the Mongolian people's soldiers, will not betray
and will not associate ourselves with the Russian White Tzar's soldiers and the Mongols who befriended them.
The Commander-in-Chief of the People's Armed Forces D. Sukhbaatar.
Party official responsible for military affairs Bilegtsaikhan.
The 27th of the first month of the Year of the White Rooster of the Mongolian calendar.
Anyone who will command the armed forces has to take an oath to achieve his goals. The Bolsheviks had this oath issued by the two Mongols just before the letters were dispatched to the battle to liberate Kyakhta.
On July 1, 1921, Begzeyev and Khorloo, representatives of the Mongolian government-in-exile, met with Chicherin in Moscow, during which they raised the Uriankhai issue. Shumyatskii had given Chicherin this advice: "For the moment, it would be better not to raise the question of the annexation of the Uryankhai to Mongolia ."The Comintern Bureau decided that the neighboring province of Uryankhai should be assisted in revolutionary activities, and after the revolution, it should become a part of the Mongol Federation. The two government representatives returned home with an understanding that soon Uriankhai would become one of the frontiers of the People's Mongolia.
A STAGED BATTLE
The common desire of all Mongols was to expel the Chinese Army and liberate Mongolia. However, Baron Ungern had already driven them out and became a "hero ."How would the Bolsheviks explain to the Mongols if the Red Army entered Mongolia and expelled the man who accomplished so much for Mongolia? Therefore, the Bolsheviks made up a theatrical show. By that time, some 1,500 Chinese, defeated by Ungern, had taken refuge in Kyakhta, where they asked for help from the Soviet government to let them cross the border. Of these 1,500 Chinese soldiers, 500 were professional soldiers (200 cavalries, 300 infantry), and the rest was newly recruited Chinese citizens. On March 18, 1921, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Paris Commune, 400 Mongol horsemen led by Sukhbaatar attacked the "10 thousand Chinese troops" in Kyakhta.
Urga had a mixed Chinese brigade and a cavalry regiment (over 4000 men). However, much of the cavalry that arrived in 1918 was sent to Kyakhta, and Xu Shuzhen returned with some of his troops in the summer of 1920. Supporters of the Anhui and Zhili cliques disagreed (Brigadier General Chu Qisian* supported the Anhui clique, and the Head of the cavalry, Colonel Gao Zaitian* supported the Zhili clique), and the Chinese Army lost control after Xu Shuzheng returned. When Baron Ungern conquered Urga, the Chinese fled in all directions. Ungern and Naidan wang liquidated at Choir those who fled south. As a result, the Chinese Army had no choice but to reach Upper Udisk via Khyagta and Troitskossavsk, where they had to take the train to Manchuria.
In connection with the capture of the capital by Baron Ungern, the Republic of the Far East put pressure on the Chinese authorities to send troops to Mongolia. The representative of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Makstenek suggested to Lu Pandao*, Chinese Consul General in Kyakhta, that Russian forces be deployed near Kyakhta to fight Baron Ungern in collaboration with Chinese troops and that these troops be released unconditionally after the defeat of Baron Ungern. Lu Pandao rejected the proposal. However, the Red Army crossed the border and was stationed 30 km south and 20 km west of Kyakhta. On February 19, 1921, Makstenek met Chen Yi and his deputy Li Yuan, who had fled to Kyakhta, and proposed the same. Chen Yi agreed to the Red Army being stationed near Kyakhta but said he would respond after asking Beijing if Soviet and Chinese troops would advance towards Urga together.
Chen Yi said they had enough soldiers but asked for help with food, weapons, and guns. On February 25, 1921, Irkutsk replied to the Chinese officials who had requested arms and firearms to fight against Baron Ungern, saying: "Mongolia is a sovereign state and that the Republic of the Far East does not interfere in its internal affairs ."On the other hand, the Russians supported the reception of Chinese and Mongolian asylum seekers. "... Also, Irkutsk instructed: "We ordered the commandment of the 5th Army to arm the MPP revolutionaries to enable our soldiers to protect the borders without entering Mongolia and destroy Ungern forces, supported by free operations of the MPP guerilla groups, led by its political cadre, and to execute the order of the military commandment to occupy Kyakhta. In the talks with Mongol revolutionaries and pro-Soviet Mongolian princes, Irkutsk should declare Mongolia to be genuinely independent and declare war on foreign invaders, like Baron Ungern. To show Soviet Russia as a humane country, K.I Grünstein*, a member of the 5th Army Revolutionary Military Council, ordered that anyone attacked by Baron Ungern could take refuge with the Soviets and that the 5th Army trainers should be assigned to MPP detachments to help conquer Kyakhta.
On February 20, 1920, in Troytskossavsk, negotiations took place between Makstenik and Chen Yi. The talks decided that the Chinese refugees driven out by Ungern would return to China via the Far Eastern Republic. Chen Yi promised the Soviet representative: "If Soviet Russia helps the Chinese exiles to return to their homeland, the Chinese side will not oppose the Red Army in its fight against Baron Ungern this summer." In other words, Chen Yi authorized the entry of the Red Army into Mongolia.
If Russian troops confronted Chinese troops, relations between Russia and China would have become highly complicated. Therefore, when the People's Army attacked Kyakhta, the Far Eastern Republic troops were to be stationed not far from Kyakhta and ready to cover the attack and support.
On March 15, 1921, Makstenek, a representative of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, demanded that the Chinese surrender without fighting and added: "If the Chinese troops lay down their arms and give the city without a fight, the Russians can protect the lives of the Chinese citizens and send them back to their homeland."
The Bolsheviks, who had urged the Chinese to join forces against Baron Ungern, quickly tightened their grip. The planning was carried out by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, the General Commandment of the Red Army, the Comintern, and the Republic of the Far East, with its trainers working on the spot. Besides, the Mongolian soldiers' courage and the Red Army's assistance played a decisive role in the liberation of Kyakhta. After the uprising, the Chinese started to flee to Troitskossavsk. The Mongolian Army entered Kyakhta on the morning of March 18, but it was pushed out by noon by a Chinese detachment, which was to cushion the unfinished Chinese escape.
N. Khishigt*, a historian studying the events of 1921, clarified, "The historical facts show that there were few Russian soldiers involved in the battle for Kyakhta, ... the collection of Mongolian dresses intended for the Red Army and the resolution of the Conference on the battle of Kyakhta testify to this. "F.S. Mansvetov*, former Chairman of the People's Assembly of the Republic of the Far East, wrote: "In 1921, I saw with my own eyes that red soldiers of the Red Army, dressed in Mongolian clothes, were sent to Mongolia to participate in the establishment of the "independent" Mongolian People's Republic within the framework of the "Mongolian proletarian uprising". The Far Eastern Republic confiscated the weapons and arms of the Chinese soldiers in Kyakhta and, after more than a month of sheltering Chinese officials and civilians led by Chen Yi, transported them to Manchuria via Chita.
It is estimated that 200 to 400 Mongols participated in the liberation of Kyakhta, but all official documents mention 400 men to make the event more dramatic. The Mongolian People's Army sections are said to have moved along the border areas in early March and recruited up to 400 volunteers. But, it seems impossible to enlist so many people in such a short time. It is also unclear where the number of 10,000 Chinese soldiers in Kyakhta came from, but perhaps the grotesque propaganda turned into reality which had to be impressive. Sources attest that there were between 1,500 and 1,800 Chinese soldiers. In 1920-21, the pneumonic plague spread in North Manchuria and attracted the attention of the International Red Cross. However, on March 22, 1278, soldiers and civilians who escaped from Urga were loaded on a train and entered Russia through the port of Manjul. The officials of the Far Eastern Republic handed it over to China. These are the Chinese soldiers in Khiagta, Mongolia. Makstinik and Chen Yi agreed to send out the troops through the Manchurian Railway. It is close in terms of numbers.
At that time, most of the population of the border regions fled the fighting between the troops of Ungern and the Chinese, taking refuge in the mountains and forests, while the true patriots joined the ranks of the Baron to fight with the Chinese. According to the testimony of Jügder Damdin, a guerilla fighter directly involved in these events, the Mongols and monks provided nearly 300 pieces of Mongol deel, the traditional clothing of the Mongols, and hats in three days to around 400 Russian and Buryat cavalrymen enlisted in Sukhbaatar's Army. He counted that Ninjdolbiin monastery provided 130 lama deels and Erdenevan sanctuary donated 150 lama deels for the soldiers.
Reference can also be made to the minutes of the meeting of the Provisional Government of Mongolia, the Red Army Headquarters, and representatives of the Comintern, dated March 7, 1921, which states:
To prepare and conduct military operations in Mongolia, it is necessary to include Red Army units under the command of Ivanov in the Mongolian Army and provide them with clothing.
There is also a letter addressed to Sukhbaatar by the staff of the Red Army Headquarters Lyatte dated March 15, 1921, asking: "... to provide clothing to the 20 Russian soldiers who will operate heavy machine guns ..."
In addition, Beis Sumiya, who fled Chahar and passed through Il Tarvagatai, joined the 400 horse riders storming Kyakhta. The People's Party's seven men initially asked for 300 machine guns from Russia, whereas now, for the Kyakhta battle, the Russians gave four free machine guns.
To conclude from all these facts: the Bolshevik Russian soldiers wearing Mongolian clothes did not come to join forces in the attack of "10,000" Chinese soldiers by the "400" Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, but to prevent the "battle" between the two sides from becoming a real battle. Most of the Chinese had already crossed the border to Troitskosavska under the protection of the Bolsheviks before the battle. When the battle began, the remaining minority was also escorted across the border. There are no reports of casualties from either side in the battle to liberate Mongolian Khyakhta.
Later, for ideological reasons "with scientific grounds," a myth was composed that a few Mongols, poorly armed, with almost only clubs, defeated a vast Chinese army with thousands of soldiers.
At the time, Mongolian soldiers sang:
We, disciples of correct faith,
Having raised the yellow flag,
In the name of religion,
We go to the Shambhala war
Later, this song was changed to read:
We revolutionaries of dignified state
Having raised the red flag,
We're going to a just war
To fight the traitor Naidan Wang
And, much later, since Naidan Wang was long forgotten, it was replaced with "enemies."
* Xu Shuzheng (1880-1925) Chinese warlord, general. He entered Mongolia in 1919 under the leadership of military forces.
* Ungern von Sternberg, Roman (1886-1921) An anti-communist general in the Russian Civil War. Executed on 1921 in Novonikolayevsk.
* Bodoo, Dogsomyn (1885-1922) A Prime Minister of Mongolia (1921) Executed in 1922.
* Choibalsan, Khorloogiin (1895-1952) The dictator of the Mongolian People`s Republic and Marshal of the Mongolian People`s Army, Prime Minister of MPR (1938-1952). It is possible that he was poisoned in 1952 in Moscow.
* Pershin, Dmitry (1860-1936) Irkutsk journalist, Russian and Siberian writer, historian, and public figure. He worked in Mongolia from 1915 to 1927.
* Danzan, Soliin (1883-1924) One of the founders of the People's Party, Minister of Finance (1921-1924) Executed on 1924.
* Jibtsundamba VIII (1869-1924) 8th Reincarnation of Jibtsun Darnath. Also called Bogda Khan or Living Buddha. Khan of Mongolia (1911-1924) He may have been poisoned in 1952.
* Sukhbaatar, Damdiny (1893-1923) Mongolian statesman, military general, and minister of the Ministry of Military Affairs (1921-1923) It is possible that he was poisoned in 1923.
* Tseveen Jamtsarano (1881-1942) Mongolian socio-political activist and scientist. Executed in 1942 in Moscow.
* Chagdarjav, Dabdyn (1880-1922) Revolutionary figure. Head of the Asylum Government 1921). Executed on 1922.
* Dogsom, Dansranbilegiin (1884-1941) Revolutionary figure. Executed in 1941 in Moscow.
* Losol, Darizavyn (1885-1940) Revolutionary figure. Executed in 1940 in Moscow.
* Makstenik, Otto– Russian Bolshevik revolutionary. An unrecognized consul from Soviet Russia to Mongolia
* Balamsambuu, Tserenei– In Mongolia, he worked as a trade consultant for the USSR
* Rinchino Elbegdorj (1888-1938) was a Buryat nationalist revolutionary who led the Outer Mongolian Revolution of 1921 and the early political development of the Mongolian People`s Republic, Executed in 1938 in Moscow.
* Kuusinen Otto (1881-1964) was a Finnish-born Soviet communist and, later, Soviet politician.
* Chen Yi (1873-19?) Chinese representive in Outer Mongolia, amban in Uliastai (1915) and in Khuree (1917)
* Tserendorj, Sambadondovyn (1872-1934) Mongolian Prime Minister (1921). Executed in 1930.
* Shumiatsky, Boris (1886-1938) A Soviet politician, diplomat, and the de facto executive producer for the Soviet film monopolies Soyuzkino. He was the premier of the Far Eastern Republic (1920-1921). Executed in 1938 in Moscow.
* Abramson, Manuil (1898-1938), his pseudonym is Mazurin. Leader of the Chinese division of the Eastern People's Section of the Party (1920-1921) of the Russian Communist Party.
* Chu Qisian– Chinese general. From 1919 to 1921, he was the commander of the military garrison at the Khuree.
* Gao Zaitian – Chinese general. From 1919 to 1921, he was the commander of the military garrison at the Khuree.
* Lu Pandao– Chinese consul in Khiagt.
* Grünstein, Karl(1886-1939) Russian revolutionary Bolshevik, German-Latvian. Member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Fifth Army (1919-1920). Executed in 1939 in Moscow.
* Khishigt. N.(1958-) Mongolian historian
* Mansvetov, Fyodor(1884-1967) – A member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, a member of the White movement, was evacuated to Prague with the Czechoslovak Legion.
 Першин, Д. П. Барон Унгерн, Урга и Алтан-Булак (Самара 1999 Издат “Агни”) стр-63. [Pershin, D. P. Baron Ungern, Urga and Altan-Bulak (Samara 1999 Publishing "Agni")] p -63
 Першин, Д. П. Барон Унгерн, Урга и Алтан-Булак (Самара 1999 Издат “Агни”) стр-76-77. [Pershin, D. P. Baron Ungern, Urga and Altan-Bulak (Samara 1999 Publishing "Agni")] p -76-77
 Трифонов Евгений Халх голын тулалдаанд хэн хохирсон бэ? Аз жаргалтай улсын адармаатай замнал (Nepkopublishing Улаанбаатар 2019) х-180 [Trifonov Evgenyi Who lost in Halhyn gol? (Nepkopublishing Ulaanbaatar 2019)] p-180
 Лузянин, С. Г. Россия, Монголия, Китай в первой половине XX в. (изд-во Института Дальнего Востока РАН, Москва, 2003) стр-109 [Luzyanin, S.G. Russia, Mongolia, China in first half of XX century ]
 Тачибана Макото Хоёр Засгийн газартай 1921 оны Монгол (Улаанбаатар 2006) х-12-13 [Tochibana Makoto Mongolia with two Governments]
 Лузянин, С. Г. Россия, Монголия, Китай в первой половине XX в. (изд-во Института Дальнего Востока РАН, Москва, 2003) стр-111 [Luzyanin, S.G. Russia, Mongolia and China in thefirst half of the 20th century]
 WCPA P2315 -Chen I to Cabinet, March 1, 1921, WCPAP2315/-Chen I to Cabinet, March 3. 1921
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