1. Introduction

For more than two years, Europe has been in a state of high agitation, which I need not describe in detail. In the cacophony of opinions and analyses on how best to face the challenges in Europe and the world, it is helpful to remember two fundamental truths, which are security and realpolitik. These are the guiding principles for shaping foreign relations. In this context the visit of the Russian president Putin to Mongolia in September 2024 was a remarkable event that provides an opportunity to discuss some fundamental questions of Mongolian und German foreign policy, including international law.

2. Security and Realpolitik

2.1 Security 

The main task of the state is to safeguard the security of its people. This applies both internally and externally. In foreign policy, which I am dealing with here, this means international security policy, i.e. protection against threats of any kind from outside and in particular against attempts by other states to impose their will on a foreign country (using military force if necessary) and ensuring the supply of vital goods. Vital goods for Germany are, for example, raw materials. 

To ensure the security of a country, foreign policy must take into account the interests of its neighbours and the major powers operating in the region, but only to the extent that this does not harm the interests of the country.

2. 2 Realpolitik

The second aspect consists of not taking what is desirable as a given and thus not placing ideology above analyzing facts. The term ‘value-led foreign policy’ (Wertepolitik) describes this complex of attitudes and the actions derived from them. Although the concept of realpolitik is discredited in the woke circles of German society, it is still valid - and even more so now. This applies in particular to the mantra of German politics, which is international law. Politicians of all colours invoke international law in international crises, just as shamans invoke spirits, ancestors or other entities. 

But the reality is more complicated: a renowned German standard work on international law already addresses the main problem in its foreword by stating that the aim of communicating international law is to avoid ‘conveying unfulfilled or unrealizable hopes in the law’.[1] I will return to this aspect in the course of my article.

3. Security of Mongolia

Mongolia poses no threat to its two immediate neighbours or to other states. The policy of all Mongolian governments to date, and certainly of those to come, is peaceful. Mongolia could not even realize aggression towards others, because it is consistently weak in the dimensions of foreign policy power deployment - militarily, economically, technologically and culturally. It is far inferior in every respect to its two neighbours Russia and China, which are the only ones that matter.

Mongolia is far removed from the world's crisis centres, be it Europe, the Middle East or the South China Sea. It can stay out of these conflicts without harming its interests. Votes in the UN General Assembly, which are mainly symbolic and have no real practical impact, can be managed by abstention.

Mongolia's economic dependence on Russia, and to an even greater extent on China, is a major weakness. Another limitation is its famous sandwich location, as access to the world by land, air and sea is only possible via Russia and China. Economic restrictions, border closures or other ‘punishments’ by the two neighbours would have a direct and lasting impact on Mongolia's stability. 

At the same time, however, its economic and geographical location, as surprising as this may seem at first glance, is an asset. For both Russia and China, Mongolia is an indispensable buffer state. Although both states are united in their endeavours to limit the dominance of the USA or the West in the world, they are also competitors in terms of their position in Asia and the world in general due to many factors. Neither state can have an interest in weakening, destabilizing or even militarily intervening in Mongolia. It makes no sense for them to create serious problems with Mongolia in view of the major areas of conflict in the world in which both are directly or indirectly involved. In other words: Neither China nor Russia are a threat. However, this presupposes that Mongolia behaves accordingly, which I will explain below.

There is another aspect to the sandwich situation: none of the ‘third neighbours’, including Germany and the EU, can effectively support Mongolia in the event of serious conflicts with its two direct neighbours. This even applies to the USA, which alone has the means to do so, as these means are ultimately military. Suffice it to say that the use of the military would involve armed conflicts with nuclear powers, which - apart from other limiting factors - represents an insurmountable obstacle, as the war in Ukraine shows. In view of this situation, the strategic partnership with the USA is smoke and mirrors. However, this also means that neither the USA nor other ‘third party neighbours’ can put Mongolia under pressure in a threatening way, which expands its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. As a thought experiment, imagine the unlikely event that ‘the West’ or the USA were to impose sanctions on Mongolia: in this case, Mongolia could cover all its needs in China and/or Russia and could also export to both markets.

As a Mongolian diplomat quoted by Udo Barkmann rightly points out, Mongolia has completed 80-90 per cent of its foreign policy if it can get along with Russia and China.[2] This presupposes that it does not cross certain red lines: For Russia this is currently, i.e. in view of the Ukraine war, mainly the fact of not voting against Russia (and possibly its main allies) in international bodies, and for China this is mainly the Taiwan issue. New lines may be added. Putin's visit to Mongolia in September 2024, which I discuss below, was a particular red line.

4. Realpolitik

The West's policy towards the countries of the ‘Global South’ is characterized - with nuances in the various states - by moralizing, rhetoric of concern, symbolic acts, interference in internal affairs and an unreflected fixation on international law[3] and is a direct result of a ‘value-led foreign policy’. Germany is the main representative of this policy direction. I have to add, that I consider Mongolia to be part of the ‘Global South’. 

Western policy is not well received by the vast majority of the world's population, is increasingly isolating the West and Germany internationally and is significantly limiting its ability to act effectively. The war in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and developments in Asia clearly demonstrate this. The isolation is mainly due to the fact that the values policy cannot be upheld worldwide and the justified accusation of applying double standards damages the credibility of Germany and the West. This does not mean completely abandoning values, but they must be categorized in the overall field of interests and the real possibilities of implementation.

The era of global dominance by Europe is coming to an end. There are no longer any automatic alliances and automatic solidarity, be it along historical continuities, determined above all by the colonial past, and/or by appealing to common values and convictions. Europe must finally realize that its values and advice are not seen as binding by the majority of the world and are certainly not followed in practical politics. The influence of the West/Europe in the world is dwindling. Western problems - see Ukraine - are not those of the ‘Global South’. With the exception of Russia and China as globally active powers, the Middle East is also not a problem area for large states such as India, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia. 

5. Mongolian foreign policy

The culmination of the developments described above was the Russian president's state visit to Mongolia at the beginning of September 2024, which led to Mongolia being vehemently criticized in the international media and by human rights groups, especially by Ukraine, which is not surprising, and also by the German Federal Foreign Office and the ICC (International Criminal Court). The Federal Foreign Office summoned the Mongolian ambassador to Germany to express ‘the dissatisfaction of the German government’ and to point out the damage ‘caused to international law and the reputation of the ICC’.[4] The ICC declared on 24 October 2024: ‘ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II finds that Mongolia failed to cooperate in the arrest and surrender of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and refers the matter to the Assembly of States Parties.’[5]

Putin's visit had two aspects: The first was about Mongolia providing a stage for an enemy of Western values and an aggressor from a Western and German perspective, which allowed Putin to demonstrate that the West's intention to isolate him internationally was not working. The second aspect was the execution of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) arrest warrant against Putin, which Mongolia renounced, thus disregarding international law, although this did not surprise anyone familiar with the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia.

What was behind the Mongolian decision? The answer is simple: You can't really ask any state to commit political suicide. A hypothetical „arrest and surrender“ of Putin would be worthwhile material for a novel, but this was and is not a political option for Mongolia

This brings us to international law and its quasi ‘magical’ effects ascribed to it in the public debate in Germany, which Carlo Masala describes as the ‘illusion of juridification’ of international relations.[6] International law finds its limits in the vital interests of a state. It is a consensus law that only applies to the extent that the international community wishes to implement it. The basic problem is that there is no global authority that can pursue violations of international law ‘ex officio’ and on the basis of the monopoly on the use of force, as is the case within a state, regardless of political interests. Only the United Nations Security Council (SC) can decide on such measures, whereby the veto rights of its five permanent members and the willingness of individual states to effectively participate in the measures decided upon limit its effectiveness. The legitimacy and thus acceptance of the SC in the Global South is also weakened by the fact that the five members with the right of veto - the USA, Russia, France, the UK and China - no longer adequately represent the economic and political interests of the Global South and the power relations in the world (‘North-South divide’).[7] 

In the area of international security, ‘the law of the jungle still applies.’[8] Why should a country like Mongolia, which is existentially dependent on prosperous relations with its large neighbours, fundamentally jeopardize this relationship and thus its stability when other states disregard the international law on all possible occasions without being held accountable for it?[9]

With regard to German-Mongolian relations, I have argued in an essay that, due to the current geopolitical shifts, bilateral relations between Germany and Mongolia may cool down in official policy, as mutual interests do not always coincide. I also expressed my doubts ‘that German foreign policy is capable of constructively dealing with the geostrategic dilemma Mongolia finds itself in.’[10] The German reaction to the Putin visit shows this: Summoning the Mongolian ambassador as a diplomatically weighty way of expressing one's displeasure puts an unnecessary strain on German-Mongolian relations. Both sides should be aware of each other's position and that Mongolia, in particular, could not do otherwise. Instead of making an ineffective point, it would have been wiser to simply let the matter run its course. Less is sometimes more. 

In this context, an interview with Mongolian Foreign Minister B. Battsetseg from 4 September 2024 the news agency Montsame is revealing. In this interview, she places the Putin visit in the overall context of Mongolian foreign policy.[11] She names the cultivation of friendly relations with Russia and China as a ‘top priority’ and describes Mongolian foreign policy as ‘peace-loving, open, independent and versatile’. That is exactly the line, and one can only support Mongolia in this. The world is reorganizing itself, and Mongolia must assert itself in this world and find its place. The approach of an independent foreign policy that is orientated towards the country's security interests is exactly the right one.[12]

Berlin, 01 November 2024

Notes

[1] Ipsen, Knut: Völkerrecht. München: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG 2018, preface.

[2] Barkmann, Udo B.: Mongolisch-Russische Beziehungen. In: Mongolische Notizen. Mitteilungen der Deutsch-Mongolischen Gesellschaft, Nr. 30/2023.

[3] Krause, Joachim: Politiker müssen im Nahost-Konflikt jetzt mit moralisierenden Appellen aufhören. In: Focus online. https://www.focus.de/experts/kommentar-von-joachim-krause-politik-muss-in-nahost-konflikt-jetzt-mit-der-betroffenheitsbesoffenheit-aufhoeren_id_260374425.html (08.10.2024). Krause's demand relating to the Middle East conflict applies to German foreign policy as a whole.

[4] Statement by the Mongolian Ambassador B. Mandakhbileg in a conversation with Renate Bormann on 11.09.2024. German-Mongolian Society, Bonn. ICC = International Criminal Court.

[5] Cour Pénale Internationale/International Criminal Court: Ukraine Situation. https://www.icc-cpi.int/ (29.10.2024).

[6] Masala, Carlo: Weltunordnung. Die globalen Krisen und die Illusionen des Westens. München: C.H. Beck 2022, p. 60. Masala mentions the following further illusions: Democratization, military intervention and institutionalization. From the point of view of realpolitik, one can only agree with Masala in all passages of his book. 

[7] Ipsen, op. cit. p. 293.

[8] Masala, op.cit., p. 61.

[9] In this context, it is interesting to note that the three global powers and permanent members of the SC, the USA, Russia and China (as well as other, less influential states) are not members of the ICC Statute. They are therefore not prepared to submit to international jurisdiction. This limits the effectiveness of the ICC from the outset: ‘These three states exercise their mandate in the UN Security Council in a way that regularly does not work in the ICC's favour.’ Ipsen, op. cit. p. 782.

[10] Schaller, Peter: Ausblick auf die künftige mögliche Zusammenarbeit Deutschland-Mongolei. In: Mongolische Notizen. Mitteilungen der Deutsch-Mongolischen Gesellschaft, Nr. 31/2024.

[11] Montsame: Mongolia Maintains Balanced and Multi-Pillar Foreign Policy. https://montsame.mn/en/read/350866 (06.09.2024).

[12] I have explained the necessity of an independent foreign policy for Mongolia on the basis of geopolitical realities from various points of view in: 1) МОНГОЛ УЛСЫН ГЕОСТРАТГИЙН НӨХЦӨЛ БАЙДАЛ (Die geostrategische Lage der Mongolei). http://baabar.mn/article/peter-shaller-mongol-ulsiin-geostratgiin-nukhtsul-baidal (03.02.2021); 2) Putin, Ukraine and Mongolia. http://baabar.mn/article/putin-ukraine-and-mongolia (12.04.2022); russ.: Путин, Украина и Монголия. http://baabar.mn/article/putin-ukraina-i-mongoliya (14.04.2022); 3) Finlandization and Mongolia - A model for the future? http://baabar.mn/article/https-en-wikipedia-org-wiki-finlandization (17.09.2022); russ.: Финляндизация Монголии - модель для будущего? http://baabar.mn/article/finlandisation-of-mongolia-a-model-for-the-future?year=2022&month=08&day=08 (08.08.2022); 4) Mongolia in Asia - Geopolitics and National Security. http://www.baabar.mn/article/geopolitics-mongolia (24.11.2022); 5) Geostrategische Lage der Mongolei. In: Barkmann, Udo B. (Hg.): Transformation in der Mongolei. Miszellen aus Politik, Geschichte, Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Kultur. Berliner Mongolei-Studien. Münster: LIT Verlag 2022; 6) Die Mongolei im asiatischen Kräftefeld. In: Mongolische Notizen. Mitteilungen der Deutsch-Mongolischen Gesellschaft, Nr. 30/2023.